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Abstract 
Despite its well-known deficiencies, the text password remains ubiquitous. Researchers 
previously suggested that this apparent conundrum was due to the complexity of choosing a 
suitable authentication scheme with respect to the desired application scenario. The plethora of 
alternatives can leave decision makers flummoxed and leads to their reaching for the familiar 
text password. To alleviate these difficulties, Renaud et al. suggested ACCESS (Authentication 
ChoiCE Support System), an abstract framework to support decision makers in this struggle. In 
this paper we present the first concrete realization of ACCESS. We create a knowledge base 
from the results of a literature review and present a technique which allows decision makers to 
specify their requirements effortlessly. The central contribution of this work is the realization of 
ACCESS’ feasibility analysis based on an adapted Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). This 
adaptation allows outsourcing the burden of knowing all authentication alternatives to experts, 
while keeping the complexity of the expert part as low as possible. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite a unanimous desire by researchers, users, and decision makers alike to replace 
the text password, it remains the prevalent authentication scheme (Herley & van 
Oorschot 2012; Renaud et al. 2014). One of the primary reasons, as identified by 
Renaud et al. (2014), is that decision makers feel overwhelmed when confronted with 
the plethora of available alternatives. To address this issue, Renaud et al. proposed the 
framework ACCESS (Authentication ChoiCE Support System). It defines the 
following abstract process to support decision makers in identifying the most suitable 
authentication scheme(s) for their application scenario: First, ACCESS requires the 
decision maker to enter the requirements of her/his application scenario in terms of 
features a suitable authentication scheme must provide (e.g. accessibility aspects or 
resistance against relevant attacks). Then, a feasibility analysis is executed to identify 
the most suitable authentication schemes with respect to the specified requirements 
among all the schemes in ACCESS’ knowledge base. The result of this process is a 
number of ranked alternatives for consideration. However, ACCESS does not specify 
how this process should be implemented in practice. Figure 1 depicts ACCESS’ 
abstract process with all elements involved. 
 
Figure 1: The ACCESS decision support framework 
The goal of this paper is to provide the first concrete realization of ACCESS’ abstract 
process. We build the knowledge base from the results of a literature review (section 
2). Then we define how decision makers should specify their requirements (section 3). 
Thereafter, we present the main contribution of this paper: the implementation of the 
feasibility analysis using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty 1988), an 
established approach for decision problems (section 4). 
2. Knowledge Base 
Our first step in the realization of ACCESS was a literature review to identify relevant 
authentication schemes and their features. The results of this literature review serve as 
foundation for ACCESS’ knowledge base. Due to space constraints we forgo the 
details, which can be found the accompanying technical report (Mayer et al. 2016). 
2.1. Authentication Schemes 
Bonneau et al. (2012) present an extensive review in which they identify a list of 36 
authentication schemes. We extended this list with recent developments which we 
believe to be valuable additions, namely: FilmPW (Catuogno & Galdi 2013), CaRP 
(Zhu et al. 2014), Xside (De Luca et al. 2014), Face (Findling & Mayrhofer 2012), 
Palm Veins (Watanabe 2008), Facebook social auth (Hicks 2011), and KinWrite (Tian 
et al. 2013). Furthermore, we added older schemes not considered by Bonneau et al., 
since recent papers present user studies providing more reliable data than previously 
available. The schemes we added are: PassPoints (Wiedenbeck et al. 2005), CCP 
(Chiasson et al. 2007), and Passfaces (Passfaces Corporation 2006). Lastly, we also 
excluded one authentication scheme (the Hopper and Blum scheme), since, in the 
meantime, it has been deemed unsuitable for actual usage (Asghar 2012). Thus, the 
overall number of schemes included in our knowledge base is 45. 
2.2. Authentication Scheme Features 
ACCESS (Renaud et al. 2014) defines multiple authentication scheme features over 
five dimensions. However, these features remain abstract and difficult to measure (e.g. 
the convenience feature includes multiple metrics). Therefore, we adopt the 25 features 
used by Bonneau et al. (2012) in their survey. To increase the granularity, we define 
further sub-features for each feature based on the quasi-assignments of Bonneau et al. 
(e.g. the memorywise-effortless feature is split into the sub-features no secret to 
remember, one secret to remember, and more than one secret to remember). Due to 
space constraints, detailed definitions of the features and their sub-features are beyond 
the scope of this paper, but are available in the technical report (Mayer et al. 2016). 
Note, that we also distinguish between additive and selective features. For selective 
features, only one sub-feature can be assigned to an authentication scheme at any time 
(e.g. the memorywise-effortless feature explained above belongs to this category). For 
additive features, an authentication scheme can be assigned multiple sub-features (e.g. 
when considering the feature infrequent-errors, a scheme can be not susceptible to 
input errors as well as not susceptible to assignment errors). 
3. Specification of the Decision Maker Requirements 
Despite being well aware of the text password’s problems, decision makers continue 
to reach for this familiar option (Renaud et al. 2014). Renaud et al. identify as reason 
for this apparent conundrum the complexity of weighing all viable authentication 
schemes: decision makers simply feel overwhelmed. 
Therefore, we aim to render the specification of the requirements for the decision 
makers as effortless as possible. Our implementation lets decision makers (1) specify 
hard constraints (i.e. mandatorily required features), and (2) partially rank features to 
specify the relative importance of features (allowing tied values in case multiple 
features are equally important). Figure 2 depicts a prototype interface for the 
specification of decision maker requirements. Each feature can be individually 
selected and dragged to have the desired rank among all features. The further to the 
top a feature is placed, the higher is its importance. Also, as can be seen in Figure 2 
for the top-most feature (resilient-to-physical-observation), single sub-features can be 
selected as hard constraints making them mandatorily required by suitable schemes. 
 
Figure 2: Requirement specification in the ACCESS user interface 
4. Feasibility Analysis 
Based on the decision maker requirements, the feasibility analysis identifies the most 
suitable authentication schemes among all those available in the knowledge base. It 
supports multiple decision criteria (in ACCESS given by the decision maker 
requirements specified along the authentication scheme features) and a finite number 
of potential solutions (in ACCESS given by the authentication schemes). As such, the 
feasibility analysis represents an instantiation of the multiple criteria evaluation 
problem. The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) (Saaty 1988) is an established 
approach to solving such problems. It is particularly adequate for our realization 
because it can be easily adapted to work reliably even in the face of an incomplete 
specification of the application scenario by the decision maker.  
The implementation of the feasibility analysis using the AHP represents the main 
contribution of this paper. In the following we will first describe the general AHP 
methodology and present the challenges that arise from employing it for the feasibility 
analysis. Secondly, we present the adapted AHP we use to address these challenges. 
Thirdly, we describe the implementation of the adapted AHP. 
4.1. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
In this subsection we describe the general working principles of the AHP and point 
out challenges which arise from utilizing it to realize ACCESS’ feasibility analysis. 
4.1.1. Summary of the AHP 
AHP provides a means to determine attribute scores on the basis of small and 
manageable pairwise comparisons. According to its inventor Saaty (2008), AHP 
comprises four sequential steps which are depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: The Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty 2008) 
A decision problem starts with the collection of information relevant to the decision, 
i.e. the goal of the decision, criteria that influence the quality of a solution to the 
problem, and alternatives as potential solutions to the problem (definition of the 
decision problem). After its definition, the decision problem is structured in a 
hierarchical manner (construction of decision hierarchy). The root node of the 
hierarchy represents the goal of the decision problem. On the second level of the 
hierarchy, criteria contributing to the goal are expressed. On the level of criteria, one 
or more hierarchy levels can be defined. On the lowest level of the hierarchy, decision 
alternatives are compared in a pairwise manner with regard to the criterion under 
consideration. To build the basis for a decision, for any element on one specific 
hierarchy level (excluding the leaf level) a pairwise comparison of all child-elements 
is conducted (pairwise comparison of criteria and alternatives). AHP provides a 
numerical scale ["
#
, 9] to rate pairwise comparisons. The results of these pairwise 
comparisons are stored in a local comparison matrix 𝑆. If two alternatives 𝐴) and 𝐴* 
perform equally well, then the matrix entries 𝑠)*  and 𝑠*) are assigned both the value 1. 
If 𝐴) performs extremely better than 𝐴*, then 𝑠)*   is assigned the value 9, while 𝑠*) is 
assigned the value "
#
. Intermediate values on the numerical scale are 3, 5, and 7 and 
their reciprocal values respectively. This matrix forms the basis for priority vectors 
(refer to (Saaty 1988) for the details of the computation). Note that the pairwise 
comparisons of elements might lead to a violation of transitivity. AHP measures this 
violation of transitivity in terms of a consistency ratio (CR). The literature (Karlsson 
& Ryan 1997; Ishizaka & Labib 2009) widely agrees that CR values below 10% are 
acceptable. Ultimately, global priorities for decision alternatives are calculated 
(calculation of final priorities). Therefore, priorities of one hierarchy level constitute 
weights of the next lower hierarchy level. On the lowest level of the hierarchy, the m 
alternatives are globally prioritized with regard to k criteria. The final priority values 
of the alternatives are consequently the sum of all weighted priority values for the 
alternatives with regard to the lowest level criteria. 
4.1.2. Challenges of using the AHP for the Feasibility Analysis 
Need for Expert Knowledge. In its conventional form, the AHP serves decision makers 
to structure their knowledge regarding decisions to be taken, i.e. they specify the 
relative importance of decision criteria to the overall decision goal as well as the 
relative performance of alternatives to decision criteria. In the context of 
authentication schemes, it is exactly the lack of knowledge that prevents decision 
makers from abandoning established schemes and moving towards more adequate 
schemes. The first challenge is therefore to augment AHP by authentication expert 
knowledge. 
Transformation of Decision Maker Requirements into AHP Weights. Our realization 
of ACCESS accommodates for the possibly incomplete knowledge of decision makers 
with respect to their application scenario by offering an interface to specify 
requirements by setting hard constraints and partially ranking the available features. 
The second challenge is therefore to translate this input of the decision maker into 
weights for each feature as needed by the AHP. 
Scale Values. To conduct and quantify pairwise comparisons between authentication 
schemes with regard to several features, measurable differences of the authentication 
schemes have to be assigned to AHP scale values. The third challenge is therefore to 
map pairwise authentication scheme comparisons to AHP scale values. 
Complexity of the Analytic Hierarchy Process. The pairwise comparisons of decision 
criteria and decision alternatives with respect to decision criteria make the 
practicability of the decision process sensitive to the number of decision criteria and 
decision alternatives. The fourth challenge is therefore to reduce the complexity of the 
decision process. 
4.2. Adapting AHP for Use in our Feasibility Analysis 
In this subsection we address the challenges pointed out above. The basic structure of 
the feasibility analysis is shown in Figure 4 and is explained throughout this section. 
 
Figure 4: Realization of ACCESS' feasibility analysis by means of the adapted 
Analytic Hierarchy Process 
4.2.1. Need for Expert Knowledge 
To compensate for the lack of decision maker knowledge, we divide the AHP into two 
parts: one part that is to be executed by the decision makers (depending on their 
application environment using the technique explained in section 3) and one part that 
is to be executed by authentication experts (as explained in the following). As the 
pairwise comparison of authentication schemes with regard to features is not 
influenced by decision makers' requirements, the comparisons are conducted by 
authentication experts. Furthermore, the definition of the decision problem as well as 
the construction of the decision hierarchy are static for all authentication scheme 
decision problems. Consequently, the decision makers provide their requirements only 
prior to the calculation of final priorities, namely the last AHP step (see Figure 4). 
4.2.2. Transformation of Decision Maker Requirements into AHP Weights 
The specification of hard constraints serves to exclude authentication schemes from 
further consideration. Once inappropriate schemes have been excluded, the remaining 
schemes are prioritized according to the (partial) feature ranking, thereby facilitating 
the decision makers’ a posteriori decision process. The positions of selected features 
in the feature list 𝐹 = (𝑓", … , 𝑓5) dissemble the feature list into ranges of equally 
important features and specifically prioritized features.  
Each selected feature is assigned the inverse value of its specified position. Non-
selected features between two selected features 𝑓) and 𝑓* are treated as equally 
important. They obtain uniformly the inverse of the arithmetic mean between the 
selected features. Formally, this is expressed as follows: 
 
The weight values are normalized to obtain the final priority vector 𝑊8: 
w̃i =
(
|F |  i iffi selected
|F |  (
Pl 1
j=k+1 j)/(k   l   1) otherwise
 
4.2.3. Scale values 
To conduct the pairwise comparisons of authentication schemes with regard to 
features, we make explicit use of the sub-features (as explained in section 2.2). In the 
case of selective sub-features, the maximum difference between two alternative sub-
features is mapped to the scales values 99, "
#
:, while smaller differences can be mapped 
linearly. In the case of additive sub-features, the difference between the satisfaction of 
all sub-features and the satisfaction of no sub-feature can be mapped to scales values 
99, "
#
:, while again smaller differences can be mapped linearly. Consider for instance 
the selective feature memorywise-effortless already mentioned in section 2.2. The 
feature comprises the three sub-features no secret to remember, one secret to 
remember and more than one secret to remember. In case two schemes with equally 
many secrets to remember are compared, the scale values (1,1) are assigned. In case 
a scheme with no secret to remember is compared to a scheme with more than one 
secret to remember, the scale values 99, "
#
: are assigned. For the remaining difference 
(no secret to remember vs one secret to remember and one secret to remember vs. 
more than one secret to remember), we assign the intermediate value between 1 and 
9, namely 5 and the respective reciprocal value "
;
, resulting in the scale values (5, "
;
). 
4.2.4. Complexity of the Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Using the technique explained in section 3 allows us to hide the complexity of the 
AHP from the decision maker. The same is not true for the expert part of our adapted 
AHP. Given the set of 25 features and 45 authentication schemes, the number of 
25 ⋅ >;⋅(>>?")
@
	 comparisons becomes a practical limitation for the expert part of the 
feasibility analysis process. In order to reduce this complexity, equivalence classes of 
authentication schemes are constructed on the basis of sub-features (e.g. for the feature 
memorywise-effortless, there exist three equivalence classes: the schemes with no 
secret to remember, the schemes with one secret to remember, and the schemes with 
more than one secret to remember). Given 𝑛 sub-features, selective features result in 
𝑛 equivalence classes and additive sub-features result in 25 equivalence classes. 
Rather than all authentication schemes, only the equivalence classes are compared 
against each other and mapped according to the adapted AHP scale (see second 
adaptation in section 4.2.3). To take subtle variations within equivalence classes into 
account, the interval scale is extended by two intermediate scale values, namely 1.5 
and @
D
. For example, two different authentication schemes might both belong to the 
class one secret to remember, but for one of the schemes the user’s secret is her/his 
mother’s maiden name, while for the other it is a complex 20-character text password 
chosen at random by the system. These two systems cannot be distinguished based on 
equivalence classes, but using the intermediate scale values it is nevertheless possible 




w̃j) WF = [w1, . . . , wn]
T
4.3. Implementing the Expert Part of the Adapted AHP 
It has been shown how the decision making process can be facilitated by the 
incorporation of expert knowledge into the AHP. This section is dedicated to the 
realization of the AHP's expert part, namely the definition of the decision problem, the 
construction of a decision hierarchy and the pairwise comparison of authentication 
schemes with regard to features. 
4.3.1. Definition of Decision Problem 
ACCESS supports decision makers in choosing the most suitable authentication 
schemes for their specific application scenario. This goal can be directly assigned to 
the AHP's problem statement. In Section 2.2, 25 features of authentication schemes 
have been identified as decision criteria for the determination of the most suitable 
authentication scheme(s). Furthermore, our literature review resulted in 45 
authentication schemes constituting the set of possible solutions to the decision 
problem. 
4.3.2. Construction of Decision Hierarchy 
Under the core decision problem (i.e. the root node) two further hierarchy levels are 
specified. The first level of the decision hierarchy comprises the decision criteria, 
namely the 25 authentication scheme features. The second level comprises the decision 
alternatives, namely the 45 authentication schemes. 
4.3.3. Pairwise Comparison of Alternatives 
The adaptation of the AHP to the ACCESS framework requires two steps: First the 
construction of authentication scheme equivalence classes with regard to all features. 
Second, equivalence classes and schemes within equivalence classes are compared in 
a pairwise manner and mapped onto the adapted AHP scale. Due to space limitations, 
we describe these steps for one single feature, namely memorywise-effortless. The 
details for all features can be found in the technical report accompanying this 
publication (Mayer et al. 2016). The ordered sub-features are no secret to remember 
(highest priority), one secret to remember, and more than one secret to remember 
(lowest priority). The set of authentication schemes that provide the same sub-feature 
constitute one equivalence class (see the example in section 4.2.4). The maximum 
difference between sub-features is given by the sub-features no secret to remember 
and more than one secret to remember. Consequently, the comparison of equivalence  
Memorywise-effortless No secret to 
remember 
One secret to 
remember 
More than one 
secret to remember 
No secret to remember 1 5 9 
One secret to remember 1/5 1 5 
More than one secret to 
remember 
1/9 1/5 1 
 
Table 1: Scale values for the feature memorywise-effortless derived from its 
three sub-features 
classes representing these sub-features results in scale values (9, "
#
). The intermediate 
relation between the sub-features no secret to remember and one secret to remember, 
and one secret to remember and more than one secret to remember is assigned to scale 
values (5, "
;
). Eventually, the resulting performance matrix is given in Table 1. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we present our realization of ACCESS, a decision support system for 
authentication schemes. The knowledge base used by the feasibility analysis is built 
using the authentication schemes and features identified by Bonneau et al. (2012) with 
additions from our own literature review. Our realization allows non-expert decision 
makers a (partial) specification of their requirements by ranking the authentication 
scheme features and selecting hard constraints using the sub-features. The central 
contribution of this work is the construction of the feasibility analysis based on an 
adapted Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). This allows us to outsource the burden of 
knowing all authentication alternatives to experts, while keeping the complexity of the 
expert part as low as possible through the introduction of equivalence classes of 
authentication schemes. Thus, the expert part can be reused for multiple feasibility 
analyses. It must be executed only once in the beginning or when new relevant research 
findings become available. This makes the expert part highly effective in practice. Our 
vision going forward is to extend our prototype implementation and make it available 
as a collaborative platform, where authentication experts can add their knowledge, 
challenge our assessments of the reviewed literature, and add further schemes. As 
Bonneau et al. (2012) already put it: ‘to make progress, the community must better 
systematize the knowledge that we have regarding both passwords and their 
alternatives’. Our hope is to contribute to this effort by supplying this platform. 
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